Tag Archives: Cosey Fanni Tutti

Widerlegung des Idealismus

“Das blosse, aber empirisch bestimmte, Bewusstsein meiner eigenen Daseins beweiset das Dasein der Gegenstände im Raum ausser mir.”
I. Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Reklam, 1966, p. 304.

[Amateuristic English translation (an official one won’t be hard to find): “The mere, but empirically determined, awareness of my own existence proves the existence of things in the space outside of me.”]

[Re-posted from The Old Site, original dd. 22-09-2009. Short and, maybe even, sweet.]

It is a bit of a coincidence I found this back. I didn’t even mark the page when I first read it. But it’s timely. Now I am finally developing a taste for a severe form of skepticism, I need the strongest of antidotes in order not to lose myself (and maybe one or two readers) in mysticism, or, & worse, relativism.

(The reason, by the way, that I didn’t mark the page is because my younger me did not appreciate yet that everything else comes first and only then comes your self. It is not one of the instincts in the young to relativize; let alone to relativize one’s self. Continue reading

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Three Aspects of Universal Pragmatics

“It is further assumed that communicative competence has just as universal a core as linguistic competence. A general theory of speech acts would thus describe precisely that fundamental system of rules that speakers master to the extent that they can fulfill the conditions for a happy employment of sentences in utterances, (..).” J. Habermas in ‘On The Pragmatics of Communication’, edited by Maeve Cooke, P.47, MIT Press, 1998.

I have a great sympathy for some of the failed philosophers like Popper, Habermas and Jaynes. They have a research program based on a great hunch after which they fail to come up with the technical details and get sidelined because of the fact that progress is mostly – and luckily also still in philosophy – a matter of technical progress. 

Habermas is important to me because his goal is also my goal: to trace back the moral stance to the basic structure of language and to the preconditions of communication. Such an unashamed aprioristic starting point is to me the only possible route to a really universal claim to humane behaviour; a claim that is not based on traditionalist or maximalist or essentialism assumptions that cannot but lead to a morality characterized by the final non-morality of exclusion.

But he fails in the details.

Continue reading